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Abstract
In many wireless communication networks a common channel is shared by multiple users who must
compete to gain access to it. The operation of the network by self-interested and strategic users usually
leads to the overuse of the channel resources and to substantial inefficiencies. Hence, incentive schemes are
needed to overcome the inefficiencies of non-cooperative equilibrium. In this work we consider a slotted-
Aloha like random access protocol and two incentive schemes: pricing and intervention. We provide some
criteria for the designer of the protocol to choose one scheme between them and to design the best policy
for the selected scheme, depending on the system parameters. Our results show that intervention can
achieve the maximum efficiency in the perfect monitoring scenario. In the imperfect monitoring scenario,
instead, the performance of the system depends on the information held by the different entities and, in
some cases, there exists a threshold for the number of users such that, for a number of users lower than
the threshold, intervention outperforms pricing, whereas, for a number of users higher than the threshold
pricing outperforms intervention.
Index Terms
MAC protocols, Game Theory, Pricing, Intervention
I. INTRODUCTION
In wireless communication networks, multiple users often share a common channel and contend
for access. Many distributed Medium Access Control (MAC) protocols, some of them being used
2in current international standards (e.g., IEEE 802.11 a/b/g/n), have been designed assuming that
users are compliant with the protocol rules. Unfortunately, a self-interested and strategic user
might manipulate the protocol in order to obtain a larger share of the channel resource at the
expense of that of the other users.1 In the literature, adopting game theoretic approaches [2], it
is shown that the presence of self-interested users usually leads to the overuse of the channel
resource and to substantial inefficiencies [3]–[5].
We consider a slotted-Aloha like random access protocol, where each user transmits within a
slot according to some user-chosen probability. Without any further mechanism, self-interested
users would implement the always transmit strategy, resulting in the network collapse. To make
the network robust to selfish users, it is fundamental to design a scheme that provides to the users
the incentives to adopt a better (from the network designer point of view) strategy.
In the past decade a lot of research was dedicated to the development of such incentive schemes
for slotted-Aloha like random access protocols. Some of this research, such as [6]–[10], adopts
pricing schemes that charge the users for their resource usage.2 In this way, it is in the self-interest
of each user to limit its access probability. Such pricing schemes may achieve the goal of efficient
use of network resources. However, they suffer from the following drawbacks: (1) the designer
has to know how the prices affect the users’ utilities to design an efficient scheme; (2) it is not
clear what do to with the collected money, unless the network is managed by a profit-making
enterprise; (3) a secure infrastructure to collect the money is needed.
Recently, a new incentive scheme, called intervention, has been proposed in [11] and has
been applied to MAC problems [12], [13]. In this scheme, an intervention device is placed in
the network. Such a device can monitor the users’ behavior and intervene affecting the users’
resource usage. The action of the intervention device depends on the actions of the users. The
intervention device provides the incentives for the users to obey a given access probability rule by
1In [1] the 802.11 MAC protocol of a commercial Broadcom chipset is replaced with a state machine execution engine which
allows to program and use the desired MAC protocol. Such a capability of modifying MAC protocols results in our concerns for
self-interested users in future wireless networks.
2Notice that in the literature pricing schemes may refer also to distributed schemes in which the users are cooperative and
fictitious prices are used to obtain an efficient distributed algorithm. In our case, we consider strategic and selfish users, thus, to
be effective, the pricing scheme requires the users to pay real money.
3threatening punishments if users disobey. Intervention is more robust than pricing because users
cannot avoid intervention as long as they use network resources, but they might be able to avoid
monetary charges. The implementation of an intervention scheme requires to place an additional
device, i.e., the intervention device, in the network.
Repeated games can also encourage cooperative behaviors [14]. In this case users are forced
to take into account how their current actions can influence the future actions of the other users.
A cooperative behavior is induced by punishing deviating users in the future. Differently from
the previously considered methods, this scheme does not require the presence of a central entity.
However, it requires a repeated interaction among users and the users must keep track of their
past observations and be able to detect deviations and to coordinate their actions in order to
punish deviating users. We exclude incentive schemes based on repeated games because of these
difficulties.
In this paper we provide the tools to design pricing and intervention schemes to make a random
access protocol robust against strategic users. As in most of the previous works in pricing and
intervention, we consider only linear intervention and linear pricing schemes, because they are
simple to implement and yet efficient enough to achieve high performance (or even optimality
in some cases). Simple rules are important in particular for pricing schemes, because the users
might not accept to pay for their resource usage following complex rules. It is difficult to argue
between different incentive schemes in general: depending on the particular deployment scenario,
the performance criterion, and the implementation issues, each one of the incentive schemes can
be better than the others. The problem of the network designer is to identify the scheme that best
fits its requirements and to design the best policy for the selected scheme.
The complexity of the design process and the performance achievable depend on various features
of the system, such as the number of users, the users’ heterogeneity, the capability of monitoring
the users’ actions and the information held by the designer and the users. To the best of our
knowledge, this is the first work that compares intervention and pricing in terms of the network
environment, the knowledge of the designer and the knowledge of the users. We focus on a
simple MAC protocol, slotted-Aloha, because it makes it possible to formulate a simple game
in which the outcomes can be computed analytically, to highlight the consequence of not taking
4into account the strategic nature of some users when designing a MAC protocol, and to obtain
important insights about possible solutions to such a problem. For these features slotted-Aloha is
widely used in game theoretic studies [6]–[10], [12], [13]. The extension of this paper to more
realistic MAC protocols will be considered in future works.
This paper is divided into two main parts. In the first part, we consider the perfect monitoring
scenario, i.e., we assume that the users’ actions are estimated without errors. We show that
intervention can achieve the maximum efficiency, i.e., the maximum social welfare, while pricing
is able to reach an efficient use of the network resources but the positive payments subtracted
from the users’ utilities prevent it to achieve the maximum social welfare
In the second part, we consider an imperfect monitoring scenario, assuming that a uniformly
distributed noise term is added to the estimated actions. We derive the optimal pricing and
intervention schemes and quantify the performance achievable in this scenario, assuming that
(1) neither the designer nor the users are aware of the estimation errors (i.e., they believe that
the designer is able to observe the users’ actions perfectly), (2) only the designer is aware of the
estimation errors, and (3) both the designer and the users are aware of the estimation errors. In the
imperfect monitoring scenario, the performance of the intervention scheme degrades considerably
as the number of users increases and the information held by the designer and the users plays an
important role. In particular, for case (3) there exists a threshold for the number of users such that,
for a number of users lower than the threshold, the intervention scheme outperforms the pricing
scheme, while for a number of users higher than the threshold the pricing scheme outperforms
the intervention scheme. In the other cases intervention allows to obtain higher performance than
pricing.
Table I summarizes some results obtained and the implementation requirements for the consid-
ered schemes. The analysis in this paper can serve as a guideline for a designer to select between
pricing and intervention and to design the best policy for the selected scheme, depending on some
system parameters such as the number of users, the statistics of the monitoring noise and the
information held by the designer and the users.
Despite its practical importance, very few works address the impact of the monitoring errors
and the information heterogeneity on the design and performance of an incentive scheme. To the
5best of our knowledge, no prior work on pricing considers the issue of imperfect monitoring on
users’ actions. As to the intervention scheme, both [12] and [13] consider the imperfect monitoring
scenario. [12] adopts the same noise model we use, but it simplifies the analysis limiting the users’
action space, whereas [13] considers a different type of imperfect monitoring, whose distribution
depends on the length of the time the intervention device takes to estimate users’ actions. However,
in both works it is assumed that the designer and the users are aware of the imperfect monitoring
model. In our work we analyze the effect of the information heterogeneity, considering also the
cases in which nobody is aware of the estimation errors and in which only the designer is aware of
the estimation errors. This provides understanding on how robust the considered incentive schemes
are with respect to the heterogeneity of information.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II we describe the considered
MAC protocol. We introduce the games that model the interaction between strategic users and we
formulate the problem of designing efficient incentive schemes in Section III. In Section IV we
derive the optimal pricing and intervention schemes to adopt in the perfect monitoring scenario
and we quantify the performance achievable. We consider the imperfect monitoring scenario in
Section V, for three different cases, depending on who is aware of the imperfect monitoring model.
Section VI concludes with some remarks.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a wireless network of n users that share a common channel and we make the
following assumptions for the contention model:
• Time is slotted and slots are synchronized;
• Users always have packets to transmit in every slot;
• If a packet is received, the receiver immediately sends an acknowledgment (ACK) packet;
• The transmission of a packet and the (possible) corresponding ACK is completed within a
slot;
• A packet is received successfully if and only if it does not collide with other transmissions;
• Each user i selects a transmission probability pi ∈ [0 1] at the beginning of the communication
and will transmit with the same probability pi in every time slot, i.e., there are no adjustments
6Incentive scheme
Performance Implementation challenges
Perfect monitoring Imperfect monitoring
Infrastructure
requirements
Information
requirements
None Network collapse Network collapse None None
Pricing Suboptimal
Suboptimal
Better than intervention
if the number of users
is large
Device that monitor users’
resource usage; secure and
reliable method to collect
the payments
Designer needs users’
utilities
Users need unit prices
Intervention Optimal
Suboptimal
Better than pricing if
the number of users is
small
Device that monitors users’
actions and intervenes
Designer needs users’
utilities
Users need intervention
rule
TABLE I
PRICING AND INTERVENTION FOR THE CONSIDERED RANDOM ACCESS PROTOCOL: PERFORMANCE AND REQUIREMENTS.
in the transmission probabilities. This excludes coordination among users, for example, using
time division multiplexing.
Notice that ACK packets are always successfully received because they are transmitted over idle
channels.
Denoting with p = (p1, . . . , pn) the transmission probability vector, the average throughput (in
packets per slot) of user i is given by
Ti(p) = pi
n∏
j=1,j 6=i
(1− pj) (1)
The resource usage of user i is therefore proportional to i’s transmission probability.
We assume that the utility of user i is given by
Ui(p) = θi lnTi(p) (2)
where the parameter θi > 0 allows to differentiate between different classes of users. The higher
θi, the higher user i’s valuation for the throughput. The logarithm makes the utility a concave
function, which models the fact that the users usually have more desire to increase their own
throughput when it is low than when it is high.
7We define the social welfare of the network as the sum of all users’ utilities:
U(p) =
n∑
i=1
Ui(p) (3)
Finally, the network is said to operate optimally if the users choose the transmission probabilities
that maximize Eq. (3). It is straightforward to check that the Hessian of U(p) is a diagonal
matrix with strictly negative diagonal entries, therefore it is negative definite. Imposing the partial
derivatives equal to 0, the unique transmission probability vector p∗ = (p∗1, . . . , p∗n) that maximizes
Eq. (3) is given by
p∗k =
θk∑n
i=1 θi
, k = 1, . . . , n (4)
We say that U(p∗) is the maximum efficiency utility.
In order to adopt the optimal transmission probability, the users need to know the sum of the
valuations θi of the other users. This information must be spread in the network at the beginning
of the communication. This can be done either in a distributed way or in a centralized way.
In particular, in the last case an entity (e.g., a predetermined user or the access point) might
collect the users’ valuations and broadcast to all users the value
∑n
i=1 θi. Once the users have this
information, they can locally compute their optimal transmission probabilities according to Eq.
(4) and adopt them.
III. GAME MODEL AND DESIGN PROBLEM FORMULATION
While the network optimal transmission policy p∗ is easy to compute, the actual transmission
probability selected by each user depends on the objective of that user. If the users are compliant
with the optimal policy, then they compute and adopt p∗ and the network operates optimally.
However, if the users are self-interested and strategic, instead of complying with the optimal
policy they will adopt the transmission probabilities that optimize their own utility. Since the
interests of individual users are different from the interests of the group of users as a whole, the
network might (and usually will) operate inefficiently.
To analyze the interaction between strategic decision-makers, we exploit the models offered by
game theory. We define the contention game
Γ = (N , A, {Ui(·)}
n
i=1) (5)
8where N = {1, 2, · · · , n} denotes the set of users, A = ×ni=1 [0, 1]
n denotes the action space and
Ui : A→ ℜ is the utility of a generic user i, defined by Eq. (2). The action for user i represents
the transmission probability pi chosen by user i. Throughout the paper, we will use the terms
action and transmission probability interchangeably, and similarly for action profile (a collection
of the users’ actions) and transmission probability vector.
A widely accepted solution concept for non-cooperative games is the Nash Equilibrium (NE),
defined as the action profile pNE so that each user obtains its maximum utility given the actions
of the other users, i.e.,
Ui
(
pNE
)
≥ Ui
(
pi, p
NE
−i
)
, ∀ i ∈ N , ∀ pi ∈ [0, 1] (6)
where p−i denotes the transmission probabilities of all the users except for user i.
The NEs of the contention game Γ can be easily characterized considering the following cases.
1) Assume that all user, except for user i, adopt a transmission probability strictly smaller than
1. Then the utility of user i is increasing in pi: the higher the transmission probability chosen
by i the higher i’s throughput. Thus, i chooses pi = 1.
2) Assume that there is at least a user j 6= i that adopts a transmission probability equal to 1.
Then the channel is always busy and user i obtains a throughput equal to 0, regardless of its
transmission probability.
In case 1) pi = 1, in case 2) pj = 1 Thus, p is a Nash Equilibrium of the contention game Γ if
and only if at least one user adopts a transmission probability equal to 1. Notice that pi = 1 is a
weakly dominant strategy for every user i, i.e., ui(1, p−i) ≥ ui(p), for every action profile p. In
our contention game each user has an incentive to adopt the always transmit strategy, resulting
in network collapse.
Here we ask if it is possible to design the network to make it robust against strategic users. We
want to introduce some mechanism to deter the users from adopting high transmission probabilities.
The incentive schemes we consider belong to two classes:
• Pricing: users are charged depending on their transmission probabilities
• Intervention: the users’ resource usage is affected by the intervention device, in a way that
depends on the users’ transmission probabilities
9The interaction between the designer, the users and the system can be roughly summarized into
three stages, (1) the design stage, (2) the information exchange stage, and (3) the transmission
stage.
In the design stage the designer designs the pricing or intervention scheme. Specifically, the
designer predicts strategic users’ actions given any pricing or intervention scheme, and chooses
the pricing or intervention scheme that results in the most desired outcome. This is done once,
then the designer leaves the system forever. Notice that, to efficiently design these schemes, the
designer has to know how pricing or intervention affect the users’ utilities. This might be easier
for the intervention scheme, in which the users’ throughput is altered. In this case the designer
has to know only the relation between the throughput and the utility of each user. Differently, in
the pricing schemes users are charged for their resource usage. Hence, the designer has to know
how throughput and payments are connected to the utility of each user. In this work we implicitly
assume that the designer knows these dependencies, because we focus on a particular relation
between the utilities, the throughput, and the payments.
In the information exchange stage some useful information is collect and, possibly, distributed.
The intervention device (or the device that manages the payments in the pricing scheme) has
to identify the users that are connected to the network, has to inform them about the adopted
intervention or pricing scheme, and has to learn the action they select. For the latter point, it
can estimate them through its monitoring technology, e.g., by counting the number of correct
transmissions of each user in a certain time interval. Since this time interval must be finite, the
estimation might be affected by errors. To consider the impact of this imperfect estimation we
will denote by pˆi the estimated action of user i, by pˆ the estimated action profile and by πi(pˆi | pi)
the probability density function of i’s estimated action, given that i’s action is pi. We say that
the monitoring is perfect if the users’ actions are estimated without errors, i.e., pˆi coincides with
pi.
3 We say that the monitoring is imperfect if the estimates are affected by errors, i.e., there is a
positive probability that pˆi is different from pi.
In the transmission stage the users transmit the packets adopting the same transmission proba-
bility and, in the meantime, they have to pay for their resource usage based on the pricing scheme,
3In this case pii(pˆi | pi) might be thought as a Dirac delta function centered in pi.
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or their resource usage is affected based on the intervention scheme.
In this paper we play the role of a benevolent designer that seeks to design the pricing and
intervention rules to maximize the social welfare of the system in the transmission stage. We
neglect the social welfare obtained in the information exchange stage because we assume that the
transmission stage length is much longer than that of the information exchange stage.
A. Pricing
Pricing schemes use monetary charges to deter users’ greediness. If i’s payment is increasing in
i’s resource usage, user i might find it convenient to limit its transmission probability. In general,
user i is charged according to the pricing rule fPi : [0, 1]→ ℜ, which is a function of i’s estimated
action pˆi. Assuming that the payments affect additively the users’ utilities, i’s expected utility is
given by
UPi (p) = E
[
θi lnTi(p)− f
P
i (pˆi)
]
= θi lnTi(p)−
∫ 1
0
πi(pˆi | pi)f
P
i (pˆi)∂pˆi (7)
where E [·] is the expectation operator.
Once a pricing scheme is selected and communicated to the users, the interaction among users
can be modeled through the game
ΓP =
(
N , A,
{
UPi (·)
}n
i=1
) (8)
Among all the possible pricing rules, there is one class of rules that is particularly interesting,
namely, the class of linear pricing rules, in which users are charged linearly with respect to their
transmission probabilities, i.e.,
fPi (pˆi) = cipˆi (9)
where ci ≥ 0 is the unit price. We restrict our attention to the linear pricing rules, as done in
most of the pricing literature, because they are computationally simple to implement and we do
not lose much, in term of performance, in doing so.
Once the prices c = (c1, . . . , cn) are fixed, since we will prove the existence and uniqueness of
the NE of the game ΓP , the social welfare can be uniquely determined. The goal of the designer
11
is to choose the unit prices c = (c1, . . . , cn) to maximize the social welfare, i.e., it has to solve
the following Pricing Design (PD) problem:
PD argmax
c
∑
i∈N
UPi (p
NE)
subject to:
ci ≥ 0 , ∀ i ∈ N
UPi (p
NE) ≥ UPi (pi, p
NE
−i ) , ∀ pi ∈ [0, 1] , ∀ i ∈ N
B. Intervention
In the intervention framework the designer deploys in the network an intervention device that
monitors the users’ actions and can intervene adopting itself an action that affects the users’
resource usage. In our case, we assume that the intervention device is able to correctly recognize
the packets transmitted by different users and to estimate the users’ actions. If the packet of a
generic user i is correctly received, the intervention device may choose to jam its ACK4 depending
on the estimate of its action. Specifically, the intervention device jams the ACK sent to user i
with a probability that is given by the intervention rule f Ii : [0, 1] → [0, 1], which is a function
of the estimated action pˆi.
The intervention level f Ii (pˆi) must be interpreted as a punishment to user i after having deviated
from a recommended (socially-beneficial) action. Such punishments are a threat to users, and must
be designed such that the users find in their self-interest to adopt the recommended actions. At the
same time, when users adopt the recommended actions, the intervention level must be minimized
(possibly, nullified), to avoid to decrease the users’ utilities.
Different from pricing, intervention changes the structure of the utility of each user affecting
directly their resource usage. In fact, the average throughput of user i is now given by
T Ii (p) = E
[
pi
(
1− f Ii (pˆi)
) n∏
j=1,j 6=i
(1− pj)
]
= pi
(
1−
∫ 1
0
πi(pˆi | pi)f
I
i (pˆi)∂pˆi
) n∏
j=1,j 6=i
(1− pj)
(10)
4Many works on security, such as [15]–[17], take into consideration the possibility of performing intelligent jamming in which
the jamming signal is concentrated on control packets.
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where
∫ 1
0
πi(pˆi | pi)f
I
i (pˆi)∂pˆi represents the average intervention level.
The utility of user i is modified accordingly
U Ii (p) = θi lnT
I
i (p) (11)
Once the intervention rules are selected and communicated to the users, the interaction between
the users can be modeled through the game
ΓI =
(
N , A,
{
U Ii (·)
}n
i=1
) (12)
We say that the intervention rules f I =
(
f I1 , . . . , f
I
n
)
sustain an action profile p, if p is a NE of
ΓI .
Among all the possible intervention rules, there is one class of rules that is particularly inter-
esting, namely, the class of affine intervention rules. f Ii : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] is an affine intervention
rule if
f Ii (pˆi) = [ri(pˆi − p˜i)]
1
0 (13)
for certain parameters p˜i ∈ [0, 1] and ri ≥ 0, where [·]ba = min {max {a, ·} , b}.
In an affine intervention rule, p˜i represents a target action for user i while ri represents the
rate of increase of the intervention level due to an increase in i’s action. If the estimated action
pˆi is lower than or equal to the target action p˜i, then the intervention level is equal to 0. If the
estimated action pˆi is higher than the target action p˜i, then the intervention level is proportional
to pˆi − p˜i, until it saturates to 1.
For ri → +∞, the intervention device jams the ACKs sent to user i whenever it detects that
i is adopting an action higher than the target one. Such a rule, which we refer to as an extreme
rule, represents the strongest punishment that the intervention device can adopt.
We restrict our attention to the affine intervention rules because they are computationally simple
to implement and we do not lose much, in term of performance, in doing so (as we will see, in
some cases such rules are even able to achieve the benchmark optimum).
Once the parameters p˜ = (p˜1, . . . , p˜n) and r = (r1, . . . , rn) are fixed, and assuming that the
users coordinate to the best (from the social welfare point of view) NE of the game ΓI 5, the
5The existence of NEs will be proved for the considered scenarios and it is easy to coordinate the users to the best NE. In
fact, we will prove that the best NE is uniquely determined by p˜.
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social welfare can be determined. The goal of the designer is to choose the parameters p˜ and r to
maximize the social welfare, i.e., it has to solve the following Intervention Design (ID) problem:
ID argmax
p˜,r
[
max
pNE
∑
i∈N
U Ii (p
NE)
]
subject to:
p˜i ∈ [0, 1] , ri ≥ 0 , ∀ i ∈ N
U Ii (p
NE) ≥ U Ii (pi, p
NE
−i ) , ∀ pi ∈ [0, 1] , ∀ i ∈ N
Differently from the PD problem, the ID problem requires a maximization with respect to the
NEs because of the non uniqueness of the NE.
IV. PERFECT MONITORING
In this section we assume that the estimated actions are equal to the real actions, i.e., pˆi = pi,
for every user i ∈ N . Hence, in Eq. (7) and (10) the integrals must be substituted, respectively,
with fPi (pi) and f Ii (pi). In the following we compute the optimal linear pricing scheme and affine
intervention rule that a designer should adopt to maximize the social welfare if the monitoring is
perfect.
A. Pricing design
Given a linear pricing scheme ci, i ∈ N , the interaction between users in the perfect monitoring
scenario adopting pricing is modeled with the game
ΓP =
(
N , A,
{
UPi (·)
}n
i=1
) (14)
where
UPi (p) = θi ln
[
pi
n∏
j=1,j 6=i
(1− pj)
]
− cipi (15)
The goal of the designer is to design the unit prices c to maximize the social welfare in the
presence of strategic users, solving the PD problem with the utilities given by Eq. (15).
Lemma 1. The unique NE of the game ΓP is pNEk =
θk
ck
, k ∈ N .
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Proof:
To compute the best response function of users k, we use the first order condition. First, we
check that UPk (p) is concave in pk (i.e., the second derivative with respect to pk is negative). Then,
we set to 0 the first derivative of UPk (p), with respect to pk.
∂UPk (p)
∂pk
=
θk
pk
− ck
∂2UPk (p)
∂p2k
= −
θk
p2k
< 0
∂UPk (p)
∂pk
= 0 −→ pk =
θk
ck
(16)
Proposition 1. The optimal pricing scheme to adopt is c∗k =
∑
i θi.
Proof:
We want to find the unit prices ck, k ∈ N , so that the social welfare U(p) =
∑n
i=1 U
P
i (p)
is maximized, assuming that the users adopt the NE action profile (i.e., we have to substitute
ck with
θk
pk
into the expression of U(p)). We first prove that U(p) is a (multivariable) concave
function, by checking its Hessian.
∂U(p)
∂pk
=
θk
pk
−
∑
i 6=k θi
1− pk
∂2U(p)
∂p2k
= −
θk
p2k
−
∑
i 6=k θi
(1− pk)2
< 0
∂2U(p)
∂pkdpi
= 0 , i 6= k (17)
The Hessian of U(p) is negative definite (it is a diagonal matrix with strictly negative diagonal
entries), so U(p) is concave. Thus, the global maximizer of U(p) can be obtained with the first
order condition
∂U(p)
∂pk
= 0 −→ pk =
θk∑
i θi
−→ ck =
∑
i
θi , k ∈ N (18)
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Notice that the transmission probabilities adopted by the users in the optimal pricing policy are
equal to the transmission probabilities adopted by compliant users to maximize the social welfare,
i.e., pNEk =
θk
c∗k
= p∗, where p∗ is defined in Eq. (4).
B. Intervention design
Given an affine intervention rule ri and p˜i, i ∈ N , the interaction between users in the perfect
monitoring scenario adopting intervention is modeled with the game
ΓI =
(
N , A,
{
U Ii (·)
}n
i=1
) (19)
where
U Ii (p) = θi ln
[
pi
(
1− [ri(pi − p˜i)]
1
0
) n∏
j=1,j 6=i
(1− pj)
]
(20)
The goal of the designer is to design the intervention rule to maximize the social welfare in the
presence of strategic users, solving the ID problem with the utilities given by Eq. (20).
Notice the p˜k = 1 and p˜k = 0 represent trivial cases. If p˜k = 1 the intervention device never
jams the ACK sent to user k, ∀ pk, and in this case pk = 1 represents a weakly dominant strategy,
as discussed in Section III. If p˜k = 0 user k is punished whenever it transmits with positive
probability. However, the aim of the designer is to maximize the social welfare, hence, it must
first guarantee a positive throughput to every user. Thus, it is always more beneficial to consider
a p˜k slightly higher than 0 instead of 0. For this reason, in the following we focus on intervention
rules in which p˜k ∈ (0, 1), ∀ k.
Lemma 2. p˜ = (p˜1, . . . , p˜n) is a NE of the game ΓI if and only if rk ≥ 1
p˜k
, for every user
k ∈ N . Moreover, once p˜ and rk ≥
1
p˜k
are fixed, among all the NEs of ΓI , p˜ is (individually
and socially) the best.
Proof: We can write rk = 1
p˜k + δ
, for some constant δ > −p˜k. Then
U Ik (pk, p˜−k) =


θk ln
[
pk
∏
j 6=k(1− p˜j)
]
if pk < p˜k
θk ln
[
−p2k + 2p˜kpk + δpk
p˜k + δ
∏
j 6=k(1− p˜j)
]
if p˜k ≤ pk ≤ 2p˜k + δ
−∞ if pk > 2p˜k + δ
(21)
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We study the sign of ∂U
I
k (pk, p˜−k)
∂pk
in the interval [0, 2p˜k + δ] to obtain the best action for user
k.
∂U Ik (pk, p˜−k)
∂pk
=


θk
pk
if pk < p˜k
θk
2 (p˜k − pk) + δ
pk (2p˜k − pk + δ)
if p˜k ≤ pk ≤ 2p˜k + δ
(22)
If δ ≤ 0 (i.e, rk ≥ 1
p˜k
), U Ik (pk, p˜−k) is continuous, increasing in pk for pk < p˜k and decreasing
otherwise. Thus, p˜k is the best action for user k.
If δ > 0 (i.e, rk < 1
p˜k
), U Ik (pk, p˜−k) is continuous, increasing in pk for pk < p˜k +
δ
2
and
decreasing otherwise. Thus, p˜k +
δ
2
(> p˜k) is the best action for user k.
Hence, p˜ is a NE if and only if rk ≥
1
p˜k
, ∀ k. Notice also that, in this situation, p˜ is a
weakly dominant strategy: it is in the self interest of each user k to adopt p˜k, independently of
the strategies of the other users. Thus, the users will coordinate to such NE.
Finally, notice that other NEs of ΓI can only be obtained when at least two users transmit
with probability 1. In fact, in this situation no user can increase its utility changing its action.
Actually, the utility can not decrease either: it is constant and it is the worst (individually and
socially) possible utility, corresponding to the situation in which the throughput of each user is
equal to 0.
Proposition 2. The optimal affine intervention rule to adopt is rk ≥ 1
p∗k
and p˜k = p∗k, for every
user k, where p∗k is defined in Eq. (4).
Proof: Given the actions of the users, the utility of a user and the social welfare are decreasing
as the intervention level for that user increases. However, using the intervention rule rk ≥
1
p∗k
and
p˜k = p
∗
k, ∀ k, the users have the incentive to adopt the action profile p = p∗ and, at the same time,
the intervention level they are subjected to is equal to 0. Thus, the outcome of the system is equal
to the benchmark optimum. Finally, this implies that rk ≥
1
p∗k
and p˜k = p∗k defines an optimal
affine intervention rule, and, more specifically, it defines also an optimal intervention rule within
the class of all intervention rules.
Corollary 1. The optimal affine intervention rule is optimal in the class of all intervention rules.
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C. Comparison between pricing and intervention and some results
By adopting either pricing or intervention the designer can provide the incentive for strategic
users to choose the optimal action profile of Eq. (4). The efficiency of the utilization of the channel
resource is optimized with respect to the valuations θi, i ∈ N , of the users. However, there is
a big difference between pricing and intervention. Intervention schemes reach this objective by
threatening the users to intervene if they do not follow the recommendations, although at the
equilibrium the intervention is not triggered and therefore the resource usage is not affected.
Conversely, pricing schemes charge each user that transmits with a positive probability, thus
affecting its utility and the social welfare. Hence, only the intervention scheme is able to achieve
the optimal social welfare that can be obtained when users behave cooperatively, i.e., when they
comply to a prescribed protocol that maximizes the social welfare.
In Fig. 1 the social welfare and the total throughput in the perfect monitoring scenario are
plotted as a function of the number of users in the system, both assuming that the users behave
cooperatively, and adopting the pricing and intervention schemes derived in Sections IV-A and
IV-B to enforce the users’ actions. A symmetric case is considered, i.e., θi = 1, ∀ i ∈ N . Thus,
the optimal transmission policy in the cooperative scenario, defined by Eq. (4), is p∗k =
1
n
, for
every user k.
The results confirm the above discussion: both schemes are able to obtain the same total
throughput of the cooperative case, but only the intervention scheme is able to maximize the
(total) users’ satisfaction. In fact, there is a finite gap, which increases as the number of users
increases, between the optimal social welfare and the one achievable with the pricing scheme.
Finally, notice that the social welfare always decreases as the number of users increases because
there are more collisions and the number of unexploited slots increases, resulting in an inefficient
utilization of the channel; this is an unavoidable consequence of the lack of coordination.
V. IMPERFECT MONITORING
We now study whether the qualitative results obtained for the perfect monitoring scenario still
hold for the imperfect monitoring case. In this section we will see that there is a substantial
difference for the intervention scheme when the monitoring is imperfect. The intuition behind
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it is related to the possibility that the estimation errors trigger the intervention even though the
users are adopting the recommended actions. As for the pricing scheme, if the expectations of the
estimated actions are equal to the real actions, each user might be overcharged or undercharged.
On average, it is charged correctly, therefore the performance is not strongly affected.
The imperfect monitoring model we consider for the estimation of user i’s action is an additive
noise term that is uniformly distributed in [−ǫi, ǫi], with 0 < ǫi ≪ 1, i.e.,
pˆi = [pi + ni]
1
0
ni ∼ U [−ǫi, ǫi] (23)
In the following we compute the best linear pricing scheme and affine intervention rule that a
designer should adopt to maximize the social welfare for different scenarios, depending on the
information that the designer and the users have about the imperfect monitoring. In particular, we
consider the following cases:
1) Nobody is aware of the estimation errors: neither the designer nor the users know about the
existence of the noise, and think that the designer can estimate perfectly the users’ actions.
2) The designer is aware of the estimation errors: the designer knows about the existence and
the distribution of the noise, while the users think that the designer can estimate perfectly
their actions.
3) Everybody is aware of the estimation errors: both the designer and the users know about the
existence and the distribution of the noise.
A. Nobody is aware of the estimation errors
In this scenario both the designer and the users believe that the users’ estimated actions, pˆ, are
equal to the real ones, p. The additive noise ni might be caused by a physical phenomenon which
is not predicted by the designer and the users. As an example, one component of the monitoring
technology might have, at a certain point, a malfunctioning that is not revealed and introduces
noise in the measurements.
Both the designer and the users have a wrong perception of the reality: they both believe that
the utilities are as in the perfect monitoring scenario even though their real utilities are affected
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by the noise. Since the users select their actions based on their beliefs, once the pricing and the
intervention rules are fixed, their interaction can still be modeled through the games (14) and (19),
as in the perfect monitoring case. Analogously, the designer designs the pricing or the intervention
rule based on its beliefs. Hence, it has no reason to select rules different from the optimal (with
respect to its beliefs) rules derived in Sections IV-A and IV-B. The only difference with respect
to the perfect monitoring case is that the real performance of the system is different from the one
expected by the users and the designer.
Notice that both users and designer might update their beliefs observing the real performance
of the system. However, this might not be easy to do due to the lack of information. On one
hand, the designer designs an intervention rule and implements it in the intervention device, then
it leaves the system. If the estimation errors are not correctly predicted in the design stage they
affect the system, unless the designer implements a mechanism in the intervention device to reveal
such errors. However, it might be difficult to discriminate between an estimation error and a real
deviation of a user trying to increase its own utility.
On the other hand, the users might not be able to recognize the effect of an estimation error. As
an example, in the intervention scheme the estimation error triggers, occasionally, the intervention,
with the consequent decrease of the throughput of a generic user i. However, user i’s throughput
decreases if another user increases its transmission probability as well. Thus, i is not able to
understand if its utility has decreased due to the presence of the estimation errors or for some
other reasons, and is not able to update its belief correctly.
This scenario has been considered in order to analyze how robust to an unknown noise the
schemes derived in Sections IV-A and IV-B are.
B. The designer is aware of the estimation errors
In this scenario the users are not aware about the estimation noise, while the designer knows
the distribution of the noise and knows that the users’ beliefs are wrong. Once the pricing and the
intervention rules are given, the interaction between users can still be modeled through the games
(14) and (19), in which the users act believing that their utilities are not affected by the estimation
noise. When designing the pricing or the intervention rule, the designer has to take into account
both that the users act strategically, according to their mismatched perceptions, and that the social
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welfare is affected by the noise. It has to solve the PD and ID problems using the expectation of
the noisy utilities given by Eq. (7) and (11) in the maximization and using the non-noisy utilities
given by Eq. (15) and (20) in the constraints. In fact, the set of constraints represents the NEs of
the game played by the users, in which the users select their action to maximize the utilities they
believe to receive, i.e., the non-noisy utilities; while the maximization reflects the choice of the
designer, that wants to maximize the real satisfaction of the users, represented by the expectation
of the noisy utilities.
Finally notice that, as described in Subsection V-A, it might be difficult for the users to reveal
the presence of the estimation errors by observing the real performance of the system.
1) Pricing design: Let pk,1 denote the unique solution of equation
θkp
3
k −
(
θk + 4ǫk
n∑
i=1
θi
)
p2k +
(
4ǫkθk − ǫ
2
kθk
)
pk + ǫ
2
kθk = 0 (24)
in (0, ǫk), assuming
θk∑n
i=1 θi
< ǫk. Let pk,2 denote the unique solution of equation
− θkp
3
k +
(
θk − 4ǫk
n∑
i=1
θi
)
p2k +
(
4ǫkθk + (1− ǫk)
2
θk
)
pk − (1− ǫk)
2
θk = 0 (25)
in (1− ǫk, 1), assuming
θk∑n
i=1 θi
> 1− ǫk.
In the proof of the following result, it is shown that pk,1 and pk,2 exist and are unique.
Proposition 3. The optimal unit price ck to adopt is, ∀ k ∈ N ,
ck =


θk
pk,1
if θk∑n
i=1 θi
< ǫk∑n
i=1 θi if ǫk ≤
θk∑n
i=1 θi
≤ 1− ǫk
θk
pk,2
if θk∑n
i=1 θi
> 1− ǫk
(26)
Proof: See Appendix A.
2) Intervention design: To design an intervention rule able to sustain the target action profile
p˜, the designer has to satisfy the condition rk ≥
1
p˜k
, ∀ k, provided by Lemma 2. The best option
for the designer is to select rk =
1
p˜k
, ∀ k, in order to sustain p˜ and, at the same time, to minimize
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the punishment adopted against k when intervention is triggered by estimation errors. Finally, the
designer has to select the best p˜k, for every user k.
Let pk,3 denote the unique solution of equation(
−θk −
n∑
j=1
θj
)
p2k +
(
2θk − 2ǫk
n∑
j=1
θj
)
pk + 2ǫkθk = 0 (27)
in (0, ǫk). In the proof of the following result, it is shown that pk,3 exists and is unique.
Proposition 4. The optimal affine intervention rule to adopt is, for every user k, rk = 1
p˜k
and
p˜k =


pk,3 if ǫk > 4θk
4
∑n
j=1 θj −
∑n
j=1,j 6=k θj
4θk + ǫk
∑n
j=1,j 6=k θj
4
∑n
j=1 θj
if ǫk ≤ 4θk
4
∑n
j=1 θj −
∑n
j=1,j 6=k θj
(28)
Proof: See Appendix B.
C. Everybody is aware of the estimation errors
In this scenario both the designer and the users are aware of the estimation errors and they
know their distribution. The interaction between users must be modeled through the games (8)
and (12) considering the real distribution of the noise in Eq. (7) and (10). The designer has to
solve the PD and ID problems using the utilities given by Eq. (7) and (11).
1) Pricing design: Once the pricing scheme is given, the interaction between users can be
modeled with the game in Eq. (8), where
UPi (p) = θi ln
[
pi
n∏
j=1,j 6=i
(1− pj)
]
−
ci
2ǫi
∫ ǫi
−ǫi
[pi + x]
1
0 ∂x (29)
Denote
C (ǫ) =
{
x :
1
2
≤ x ≤ 1− ǫ and x ln x− x ≥ ǫ
4
− 1
}
pk =


−
ǫk
2
+
1
2
√
ǫ2k +
8ǫkθk
ck
if θk
ck
< ǫk
θk
ck
if ǫk ≤ pk ≤
1
2
or pk ∈ C (ǫk)
1 otherwise
(30)
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Lemma 3. pk is the unique NE of the game ΓP .
Proof: See Appendix C.
Consider the following notation:
pk,4 =
θk(2− ǫk)
4
∑
i θi
+
1
2
√[
θk(2− ǫk)
2
∑
i θi
]2
+ 4
θkǫk
2
∑
i θi
pk,5 = max C (ǫk) (31)
Proposition 5. The optimal unit price ck to adopt is, ∀ k ∈ N ,
ck =


2ǫkθk
pk,4(pk,4 + ǫk)
if pk,4 < ǫk
θk
ǫk
if pk,4 ≥ ǫk and θk∑
i θi
≤ ǫk∑
i θi if ǫk ≤
θk∑
i θi
≤
1
2
or
θk∑
i θi
∈ C (ǫk)
θk
pk,5
otherwise
(32)
Proof: See Appendix D.
2) Intervention design: Once the intervention scheme is given, the interaction between users
can be modeled with the game in Eq. (12), where
U Ii (p) = θi ln
[
piE
[
[ri (pi + ni − p˜i)]
1
0
] n∏
j=1,j 6=i
(1− pj)
]
(33)
Lemma 4. Assume 2ǫk ≤ pk ≤ 1 − ǫk, pk is the unique NE of the game ΓI if rk → +∞ and
p˜k = pk + ǫk.
Proof: See Appendix E.
Lemma 4 states that, using an extreme rule, each user k has the incentive to adopt a transmission
probability pk which is ǫk lower than p˜k, to avoid the possibility of an intervention triggered by
the estimation errors. This is true as long as p˜k is not too low, otherwise for user k it is convenient
to adopt a transmission probability closer to p˜k, accepting the risk of an intervention triggered by
the estimation errors.
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Proposition 6. If p∗k =
θk∑n
i=1 θi
≥ 2ǫk, for every user k, then the intervention rule rk → +∞ and
p˜k = p
∗
k + ǫk is an optimal affine intervention.
Proof: According to Lemma 4, users have the incentive to adopt p∗ = (p∗1, . . . , p∗n). In this
case the intervention level is equal to 0 because the estimation errors can not be higher than
ǫ = (ǫ∗1, . . . , ǫ
∗
n). Thus, the outcome of the system is equal to the benchmark optimum. Finally,
this implies that rk → +∞ and p˜k = p∗k + ǫk define an optimal affine intervention rule, and, more
specifically, also define an optimal intervention rule within the class of all intervention rules.
Corollary 2. If p∗k =
θk∑n
i=1 θi
≥ 2ǫk, the optimal affine intervention rule is optimal in the class
of all intervention rules.
We consider the following affine intervention rule, for every user k
rk → +∞
p˜k =

 p
∗
k + ǫk if p∗k ≥ 2ǫk
3ǫk otherwise
(34)
Eq. (34) defines an optimal intervention rule if p∗k ≥ 2ǫk, for every user k. If p∗k < 2ǫk, for
some user k, the intervention rule might not be optimal. This rule is designed with the objective
to minimize the intervention level. In fact, each user i has the incentive to adopt the action p˜i−ǫi,
which results in an intervention level equal to 0.
D. Comparison between pricing and intervention and some results
In the following we investigate how the social welfare and the total throughput vary increasing
the number of users in the system, for the imperfect monitoring scenario, adopting both the pricing
and the intervention schemes. We consider the symmetric case, i.e., θi = θj and ǫi = ǫj , ∀ i, j ∈ N .
Thus, the optimal transmission policy in the cooperative scenario, defined by Eq. (4), is p∗k = 1n ,
for every user k.
First we assume that nobody, neither the designer nor the users, is aware of the estimation
errors. As discussed in Subsection V-A, the designer adopts the schemes derived in Section IV
and the users, consequently, have the incentive to adopt the action p∗k = 1n . Fig 2 shows that the
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estimation errors have different effects in the two schemes. In the pricing scheme they do not
affect the total throughput, and the social welfare is slightly affected only when the number of
users exceeds 1
ǫi
= 10 (corresponding to the condition p∗k < ǫi). In fact, if the number of users is
less than or equal to 10, each user is (on average) charged correctly. Conversely, if the number
of users exceeds 10, the expectation of the estimated transmission probability pˆk is higher than
the real transmission probability p∗k and each user is (on average) slightly overcharged, resulting
in a social welfare slightly lower than the one obtainable in the perfect monitoring scenario (see
Fig. 1). In the intervention scheme the effect of the estimation errors is stronger. In fact, they
occasionally trigger intervention, which decreases both the throughput and the utility experienced
by each user. Nevertheless, the social welfare adopting intervention is still higher than the social
welfare adopting pricing.
Now we consider the imperfect monitoring scenario assuming that only the designer is aware
of the estimation errors. In this case, the designer can adopt the optimal pricing and intervention
schemes derived in Subsection V-B. The social welfares obtainable with both schemes, shown in
Fig. 3, are only slightly higher than the social welfares obtainable when nobody is aware of the
estimation errors, shown in Fig. 2 (such differences will be clearer in Figs. 6 and 7). This means
that the designer can not gain much with the additional information on the presence of estimation
errors, and knowing their statistics. In particular, for the pricing scheme such information is useless
if the number of users is less than 10, because the best pricing schemes derived in Subsections
V-B and IV-B are identical in this situation.
Now we investigate the performance achievable in the imperfect monitoring scenario assuming
that everyone is aware of the estimation errors. In this case the users, knowing that the noise
might bias the payments (pricing) or the punishments (intervention), adopt a different NE action
profile. Since the designer can foresee the users’ behavior, it can adopt the pricing and intervention
schemes derived in Subsection V-C. Fig. 4 shows that the performance attainable with the pricing
scheme is very similar to the preceding cases, only slightly worse. Conversely, the performance
achievable with the intervention scheme is completely different from the preceding cases. The
intervention scheme is able to achieve the optimal social welfare as long as the number of users is
less than or equal to 5 (corresponding to the condition p∗k ≥ 2ǫk), as predicted by Proposition 6).
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If the number of users is higher than 5, both the total throughput and the social welfare decrease
rapidly as the number of users increases. This trend is a consequence of the action adopted by
the users in this situation, which is constant and equal to 2ǫk instead of scaling with the number
of users. This causes a rapid increase of the number of collisions. Finally, this trend determines
a threshold in the number of users such that, for a number of users lower than the threshold,
intervention outperforms pricing, whereas, for a number of users higher than the threshold, pricing
outperforms intervention. The value of the threshold for the considered system parameters is equal
to 15.
In Fig. 5 the value of the threshold is plotted varying ǫk, the maximum intensity of the noise.
The threshold decreases as ǫk increases, because the intervention scheme is more sensitive to the
estimation errors than the pricing scheme. For the highest noise considered, i.e., ǫi = 0.2, the
intervention scheme outperforms the pricing scheme as long as the number of users is less than
9.
In order to have a quantitative comparison between the different scenarios, in Figs. 6 and 7
we plot the social welfare and the total throughput achievable for all considered cases, adopting
pricing and intervention respectively. In both Figures, we see that the system achieves the best
performance if the monitoring is perfect. In case it is not, for the pricing scheme the best case is
when only the designer is aware of the estimation errors, whereas the worst case is when also the
users are aware of the estimation errors. It is not surprising that, in a strategic setting, the more
information the selfish users have the worse the efficiency of the equilibrium point. Conversely, for
the intervention scheme we notice that when the users are aware of the estimation errors the social
welfare might be higher than when they are not. This result does not contradict the previous one,
in fact it is caused by the additional information that the designer has as well: it knows that the
users know that estimation errors exist, thus, it can design different intervention rules. In particular,
it can adopt a more severe rule (e.g., the extreme rule, with rk → +∞) that forces the users to
keep their transmission probabilities low in order to avoid that the intervention is occasionally
triggered by the estimation errors. Fig. 7 shows that there is a threshold in the number of users
such that, for a number of users lower than the threshold, it is socially convenient that the users
are aware of the estimation errors, while for a number of users higher than the threshold it is not.
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Finally, in Figs. 8 and 9 we consider the imperfect monitoring scenario assuming that everyone
is aware of the estimation errors, and we compare the considered intervention scheme of Eq. (34)
with the optimal affine intervention rule. The optimal affine intervention rule is computed adopting
an exhaustive search algorithm. Notice that this is possible because we consider a symmetric
scenario. In asymmetric scenarios the calculation of the optimal rule through an exhaustive search
algorithm would be computationally too expensive. Fig. 8 shows the action selected by the users
and the average intervention level varying the number of users, while Fig. 9 shows the social
welfare and the total throughput varying the number of users. Proposition 6 guarantees that the
considered intervention rule is optimal for a number of users equal or lower than 5 (corresponding
to the condition p∗k ≥ 2ǫk). However, as we can see, the considered intervention rule is optimal
until 9 users. If the number of users exceeds 9, it is preferable to be more aggressive with the
intervention rule, using a p˜k lower than 3ǫk and forcing the users to decrease their transmission
probability as well, even though this means that the intervention is occasionally triggered.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we tackle the problem of designing pricing and intervention schemes to provide
incentives for the users to exploit efficiently the channel resource in a contention game. The design
of the optimal schemes strongly depends on the parameters of the system, such as the statistics
of the estimation errors, and on the information held by the designer and by the users.
In this work we have considered both the perfect monitoring and the imperfect monitoring
scenarios, assuming, for the latter case, that (1) neither the designer nor the users are aware of the
estimation errors, (2) only the designer is aware of the estimation errors, and (3) both the designer
and the users are aware of the estimation errors. The optimal linear pricing and affine intervention
schemes have been analytically computed (for the case (3), the considered intervention scheme is
optimal only in some conditions).
The analysis shows that the intervention scheme, differently from the pricing scheme, is able
to achieve the optimal performance in the perfect monitoring scenario. On the other hand, in
the imperfect monitoring scenario intervention might be triggered even when the users adopt the
recommended actions, resulting in a degradation of the system performance. Nevertheless, we
noticed that intervention outperforms pricing in cases (1) and (2), while for case (3), as a rough
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general principle, intervention achieves greater efficiency than pricing when the number of users
is small and the opposite is true when the number of users is large.
Another interesting result is related to the effect of the information held by the different entities.
While it is always desirable for the designer to have as much information as possible, the effect of
the information held by the selfish users is not trivial. In many cases it is preferable that the users
are uninformed, but, sometimes, the information held by the users allows the designer to design
better rules. In our particular case, we have seen that the intervention can achieve the benchmark
optimum if the users are aware of the estimation errors and the number of users is not too high.
This suggests the idea, that might be true also in other settings, of hiding some system parameters
from the users in determinate conditions.
Finally, the analysis in this paper can serve as a guideline for a designer to select between
pricing and intervention and to design the best policy for the selected scheme, depending on some
system parameters such as the number of users, the statistics of the monitoring noise and the
information held by the designer and the users.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3
Proof:
The unique NE of the game (14) is pi = θi
ci
, i ∈ N . Hence, the expected social welfare is
U(p) =
n∑
i=1
E
[
θi ln
[
pi
n∏
j=1,j 6=i
(1− pj)
]
− ci [pi + ni]
1
0
]
=
n∑
i=1
θi ln
[
pi
n∏
j=1,j 6=i
(1− pj)
]
−
θi
pi
E
[
[pi + ni]
1
0
]
(35)
where, considering ni ∼ U [−ǫi ǫi],
E
[
[pi + ni]
1
0
]
=


(pi + ǫi)
2
4ǫi
if pi < ǫi
pi if ǫi ≤ pi ≤ 1− ǫi
−p2i + 2(ǫi + 1)pi + 2ǫi − ǫ
2
i − 1
4ǫi
if pi > 1− ǫi
(36)
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Therefore
∂U(p)
∂pk
=


θk
pk
−
∑
i 6=k θi
1− pk
−
θkp
2
k − ǫ
2
kθk
4ǫkp2k
if pk < ǫk
θk
pk
−
∑
i 6=k θi
1− pk
if ǫk ≤ pk ≤ 1− ǫk
θk
pk
−
∑
i 6=k θi
1− pk
+ θk
p2k − (1− ǫk)
2
4ǫkp
2
k
if pk > 1− ǫk
(37)
and
∂2U(p)
∂p2k
=


−
θk
p2k
−
∑
i 6=k θi
(1− pk)
2 −
ǫkθk
2p3k
if pk < ǫk
−
θk
p2k
−
∑
i 6=k θi
(1− pk)
2 if ǫk ≤ pk ≤ 1− ǫk
θk
pk
−
∑
i 6=k θi
1− pk
+ θk
(1− ǫk)
2
2ǫkp3k
if pk > 1− ǫk
(38)
∂2U(p)
∂pk∂pj
= 0 , ∀ j 6= k (39)
∂2U(p)
∂p2k
is negative. For pk < ǫk and ǫk ≤ pk ≤ 1− ǫk this is trivial, for pk > 1− ǫk we have
∂2U(p)
∂p2k
=
−2ǫkθkpk (1− pk)
2 − 2ǫk
∑
i 6=k θip
3
k + (1− ǫk)
2
θk (1− pk)
2ǫkp
3
k (1− pk)
2 <
<
−2ǫk
∑
i 6=k θip
3
k + (1− ǫk)
2
θk (1− pk)
2ǫkp3k (1− pk)
2 <
−2 (1− ǫk)
3∑
i 6=k θi + ǫk (1− ǫk)
2
θk (1− pk)
2p3k (1− pk)
2 < 0
(40)
where the second and third inequalities are valid because θk∑n
i=1 θi
> 1 − ǫk (as we will see, the
optimal transmission probability pk is higher than 1 − ǫk if and only if
θk∑n
i=1 θi
is higher than
1− ǫk) and ǫk ≪ 1 respectively. Hence, the Hessian of U(p) is negative definite (it is a diagonal
matrix with strictly negative diagonal entries), so U(p) is concave. The global maximizer of U(p)
can be obtained with the first order condition.
For pk < ǫk we obtain the condition
θkp
3
k −
(
θk + 4ǫk
n∑
i=1
θi
)
p2k +
(
4ǫkθk − ǫ
2
kθk
)
pk + ǫ
2
kθk = 0 (41)
The solution of Eq. (41) exists and is unique assuming θk∑n
i=1 θi
< ǫk. In fact the left hand side is
a continuous function, decreasing in pk (its derivative with respect to pk corresponds to the second
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derivative of U(p) with respect to pk), equal to ǫ
2
kθk
0+
> 0 for pk → 0+ and to
ǫk
∑
i θi − θk
ǫk (1− ǫk)
< 0
for pk → ǫ−k .
For ǫk ≤ pk ≤ 1− ǫk we obtain the condition
pk =
θk∑n
i=1 θi
→ ck =
n∑
i=1
θi (42)
For pk > 1− ǫk we obtain the condition
− θkp
3
k +
(
θk − 4ǫk
n∑
i=1
θi
)
p2k +
(
4ǫkθk + (1− ǫk)
2
θk
)
pk − (1− ǫk)
2
θk = 0 (43)
The solution of Eq. (43) exists and is unique assuming θk∑n
i=1 θi
> 1−ǫk. In fact the left hand side is
a continuous function, decreasing in pk (its derivative with respect to pk corresponds to the second
derivative of U(p) with respect to pk), equal to θk − (1− ǫk)
∑n
i=1 θi
2ǫk + (1− ǫk)
> 0 for pk → (1− ǫk)+
and to
−
∑
i 6=k θi
0+
< 0 for pk → 1−.
Finally, notice that the solutions found are consistent with the case considered and
pk < ǫk ⇔
θk∑n
i=1 θi
< ǫk
ǫk ≤ pk ≤ 1− ǫk ⇔ ǫk ≤
θk∑n
i=1 θi
≤ 1− ǫk
pk > 1− ǫk ⇔
θk∑n
i=1 θi
> 1− ǫk (44)
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4
Proof:
Given the intervention rule p˜k and rk =
1
p˜k
, ∀ k, and the NE action profile p = p˜, the
intervention level for user i is equal to
f Ii (p˜i) =
[
1
p˜i
([p˜i + ni]
1
0 − p˜i)
]1
0
(45)
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Consequently, the expected throughput of a generic user i and the social welfare are
T Ii (p˜) = E
[
p˜i
(
1− f Ii (p˜i)
) n∏
j=1,j 6=i
(1− p˜j)
]
= p˜i
(
1− E
[
f Ii (p˜i)
]) n∏
j=1,j 6=i
(1− p˜j)
U(p˜) =
n∑
i=1
θi lnTi(p˜) =
n∑
i=1
θi ln
(
p˜i − p˜iE
[
f Ii (p˜i)
])
+
n∑
i=1
(
n∑
j=1,j 6=i
θj
)
ln (1− p˜i) (46)
Now we want check if U(p˜) is concave analyzing its Hessian. To do so, we first compute the
average intervention level E
[
f Ii (p˜i)
]
, then we calculate ∂U(p˜)
∂p˜i
and finally we compute ∂
2U(p˜)
∂p˜2i
and ∂
2U(p˜)
∂p˜i∂p˜j
, i 6= j. Notice that, to do so, we should calculate each function in three different
cases: for p˜i < ǫi, for ǫi ≤ p˜i ≤ 1 − ǫi, and for p˜i > 1− ǫi. However, to avoid a heavy notation,
we do not take into consideration the case p˜i > 1− ǫi. In fact this case is not interesting because,
since ǫi ≪ 1, the best target action for user i is close to 1 if and only if there are few users in
the network and the conditions are strongly asymmetric (i.e., θi ≫ θj , ∀ j 6= i). On the contrary,
we are interested in the case p˜i < ǫi because the best p˜i scales with the number of users. Thus,
if the network is crowded, p˜i may become close to 0.
If p˜i + ni < 0 then f Ii (p˜i) = 0. If p˜i + ni ≥ 0 then f Ii (p˜i) =
1
p˜i
[ni]
p˜i
0 . Hence, we obtain
E
[
f Ii (p˜i)
]
=


1
2ǫip˜i
∫ p˜i
0
x∂x +
1
2ǫi
∫ ǫi
p˜i
∂x =
2ǫi − p˜i
4ǫi
if p˜i < ǫi
1
2ǫip˜i
∫ ǫi
0
x∂x =
ǫi
4p˜i
if p˜i ≥ ǫi
(47)
Therefore
∂U(p˜)
∂p˜i
=


2θi (ǫi + p˜i)
2ǫip˜i + p˜2i
−
∑
j 6=i θj
1− p˜i
if p˜i < ǫi
θi
p˜i −
ǫi
4
−
∑
j 6=i θj
1− p˜i
if p˜i ≥ ǫi
(48)
∂2U(p˜)
∂p˜2i
=


2θi (−2ǫ2i − 2ǫip˜i − p˜
2
i )
(2ǫip˜i + p˜2i )
2 −
∑
j 6=i θj
(1− pi)
2 if p˜i < ǫi
−θi(
p˜i −
ǫi
4
)2 −
∑
j 6=i θj
(1− p˜i)
2 if p˜i ≥ ǫi
(49)
∂2U
∂pi∂pj
= 0 , ∀ i 6= j (50)
∂2U(p˜)
∂p˜2i
< 0. Hence, the Hessian of U(p˜) is negative definite (it is a diagonal matrix with
strictly negative diagonal entries), so U(p˜) is concave. The global maximizer of U(p˜) can be
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obtained with the first order condition, i.e., imposing ∂U(p˜)
∂p˜i
= 0. Notice that ∂U(p˜)
∂p˜i
is continuous,
decreasing (because ∂2U(p˜)
∂p˜2
i
< 0), and tends to +∞ for p˜i → 0+ and to −∞ for p˜i → 1−. Thus,
there exists one and only one p˜i such that ∂U(p˜)∂p˜i = 0.
Imposing ∂U(p˜)
∂p˜i
= 0 for p˜i < ǫi, we obtain(
−θi −
n∑
j=1
θj
)
p˜2i +
(
2θi − 2ǫi
n∑
j=1
θj
)
p˜i + 2ǫiθi = 0 (51)
Imposing ∂U(p˜)
∂p˜i
= 0 for p˜i ≥ ǫi, we obtain
p˜i =
4θi + ǫi
∑n
j=1,j 6=i θj
4
∑n
j=1 θj
(52)
This results is compatible with the condition p˜i ≥ ǫi if and only if
ǫi ≤
4θi
4
∑n
j=1 θj −
∑n
j=1,j 6=i θj
(53)
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF LEMMA 3
Proof:
E
[
[pi + ni]
1
0
]
=


(pi + ǫi)
2
4ǫi
if pi ≤ ǫi
pi if ǫi < pi ≤ 1− ǫi
−p2i + 2(ǫi + 1)pi + 2ǫi − ǫ
2
i − 1
4ǫi
if pi > 1− ǫi
(54)
Ui(p) =


θi ln
[
pi
∏
j 6=i(1− pj)
]
− ci
(pi + ǫi)
2
4ǫi
if pi < ǫi
θi ln
[
pi
∏
j 6=i(1− pj)
]
− cipi if ǫi ≤ pi ≤ 1− ǫi
θi ln
[
pi
∏
j 6=i(1− pj)
]
− ci
−p2i + 2(ǫi + 1)pi + 2ǫi − ǫ
2
i − 1
4ǫi
if pi > 1− ǫi
(55)
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∂Ui(p)
∂pi
=


θi
pi
− 2ci
pi + ǫi
4ǫi
if pi < ǫi
θi
pi
− ci if ǫi ≤ pi ≤ 1− ǫi
θi
pi
− ci
−pi + ǫi + 1
2ǫi
if pi > 1− ǫi
(56)
To compute the best response function of user i, we impose the first derivative of U(p) equal
to 0 and we analyse the concavity of U(p), with respect to pi.
∂Ui(p)
∂pi
= 0 −→ pi =


−ǫi
2
+
1
2
√
ǫ2i +
8ǫiθi
ci
if θi
ci
< ǫi
θi
ci
if ǫi ≤
θi
ci
≤ 1− ǫi
ǫi + 1
1
+
1
2
√
(ǫi + 1)2 −
8ǫiθi
ci
if 1
2
<
θi
ci
< 1− ǫi
(57)
∂2Ui(p)
∂p2i
=


−
θi
p2i
−
ci
2ǫi
if pi < ǫi
θi
p2i
if ǫi ≤ pi ≤ 1− ǫi
−
θi
p2i
+
ci
2ǫi
if pi > 1− ǫi
(58)
∂2Ui(p)
∂p2i
< 0 for pi ∈
[
0, max
(√
2ǫiθi
ci
, 1− ǫi
)]
and in max
(√
2ǫiθi
ci
, 1− ǫi
)
there is a
change in the concavity. If 1
2
<
θi
ci
≤ 1 − ǫi then, after the change of concavity, the function
reaches a local minimum in pi =
ǫi + 1
2
+
1
2
√
(ǫi + 1)2 −
8ǫiθi
ci
and then restarts to increase.
Hence, in this case there are 2 local maxima: pi =
θi
ci
and pi = 1. Comparing the 2 maxima we
obtain Ui(
θi
ci
, p−i) ≥ Ui(1, p−1)⇐⇒
θi
ci
ln
θi
ci
−
θi
ci
≥
ǫi
4
− 1.
Summarizing:
Case 1) if θi
ci
< ǫi then there is one local maximum which is the global maximum: pi =
−ǫi
2
+
1
2
√
ǫ2i +
8ǫiθi
ci
Case 2) If ǫi ≤ θi
ci
≤
1
2
then there is one local maximum which is the global maximum: pi =
θi
ci
Case 3) If 1
2
<
θi
ci
≤ 1 − ǫi and
θi
ci
ln
θi
ci
−
θi
ci
≥
ǫi
4
− 1 then there are two local maxima and the
global one is pi =
θi
ci
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Case 4) If 1
2
<
θi
ci
≤ 1 − ǫi and
θi
ci
ln
θi
ci
−
θi
ci
<
ǫi
4
− 1 then there are two local maxima and the
global one is pi = 1
Case 5) if θi
ci
> 1− ǫi then the function is increasing and the maximum is obtained for pi = 1
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5
Proof:
Considering that users adopt the NE action profile (30), we want to maximize U(p) with
respect to pk, ∀k ∈ N . The optimal pk must be lower than 1, therefore we can consider only the
first three cases listed at the end of Appendix C.
We obtain:
∂U(p)
∂pk
=


θk
pk
−
∑
i 6=k θi
1− pk
+
θkǫk
2p2k
if pk < ǫk
θk
pk
−
∑
i 6=k θi
1− pk
if ǫk ≤ pk ≤ pk,5
(59)
∂U(p)
∂pi
= 0 −→ pi =


pk,4 if pk < ǫk
θk∑
i 6=k θi
if ǫk ≤ pk ≤ pk,5
(60)
∂2U(p)
∂p2k
=


−θk
p2k
−
∑
i 6=k θi
(1− pk)2
−
θkǫk
p3k
if pk < ǫk
−θk
p2k
−
∑
i 6=k θi
(1− pk)2
if ǫk ≤ pk ≤ pk,5
(61)
d2G(p)
dpkdpi
= 0 , i 6= k (62)
The Hessian of U(p) is negative definite in [0, pk,5]. U(p) is a continuous and concave function
in [0, pk,5], increasing in pk = 0. However, its first partial derivative is not continuous in pk = ǫk.
In particular, if there exists a user k such that ∂G(p)
∂pk
6= 0 in [0, pk,5], then either (1) ∂U(p)
∂pk
> 0
for pk < ǫk and
∂U(p)
∂pk
< 0 for pk > ǫk, or (2) U(p) increases in pk until reaching a maximum
in pk = pk,5. Finally, the global maximum is located where partial derivatives are equal to 0 or,
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in case this condition is not satisfied for some users k, in pk = ǫk if
∂G(p)
∂pk
> 0 for pk < ǫk and
∂G(p)
∂pk
< 0 for pk > ǫk, or in pk,5 otherwise; i.e.,
pk =


pk,4 if pk,4 < ǫk
ǫk if pk,4 ≥ ǫk and
θk∑
i θi
≤ ǫk
θk∑
i θi
if ǫk ≤
θk∑
i θi
≤
1
2
or
θk∑
i θi
∈ C (ǫk)
pk,5 otherwise
(63)
which is equivalent to Eq. (32).
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF LEMMA 4
Proof:
We study i’s utility, U Ii (p), varying i’s action, pi. To do so, we first analyze the average
intervention level E := E
[[
ri
(
[pi + ni]
1
0 − pi − ǫi
)]1
0
]
, for ri → +∞.
If pi < pi, the term that multiplies ri is always negative (notice that [pi + ni]10 ≤ pi + ǫi) and,
consequently, the intervention level is always equal to 0 and E = 0.
If pi > pi + 2ǫi, the term that multiplies ri is always positive (notice that [pi + ni]10 ≥ pi − ǫi)
and, consequently, the intervention level is always equal to 1 and E = 1.
If pi ≤ pi ≤ pi+2ǫi, the intervention might be 0 or 1, depending on the value of the estimation
error ni. Notice that, in this case, pi + ni ≥ 0. Thus, whenever ni is higher than pi + ǫi − pi, the
intervention is 1, and the average intervention level is equal to
E =
1
2ǫi
∫ ǫi
pi+ǫi−pi
∂x =
1
2ǫi
(pi − pi) (64)
Hence, we obtain
Ui(p) =


θi ln pi + θi ln
[∏
j 6=i (1− pj)
]
if pi < pi
θi ln
[
pi
(
1−
1
2ǫi
(pi − pi)
)]
+ θi ln
[∏
j 6=i (1− pj)
]
if pi ≤ pi ≤ pi + 2ǫi
−∞ if pi > pi + 2ǫi
(65)
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To predict the best action for user i, we study the trend of Ui(p) varying pi in the interval
[0, pi + 2ǫi). To do so, we calculate
∂Ui(p)
∂pi
and ∂
2Ui(p)
∂p2i
. and we study their sign.
∂Ui(p)
∂pi
=


θi
pi
if pi < pi
θi
1 + 1
2ǫi
pi −
1
ǫi
pi(
1 + 1
2ǫi
pi
)
pi −
1
2ǫi
p2i
if pi ≤ pi ≤ pi + 2ǫi
(66)
∂2Ui(p)
∂p2i
=


−
θi
p2i
if pi < pi
θi
1
ǫi
(pi − pi)− 1 +
pi
2ǫ2
i
(pi − pi)−
p2
i
2ǫ2
i
−
p2
i
4ǫ2
i[(
1 + 1
2ǫi
pi
)
pi −
1
2ǫi
p2i
]2 if pi ≤ pi ≤ pi + 2ǫi (67)
∂2Ui(p)
∂p2i
< 0 for pi ≤ pi ≤ pi + 2ǫi. In fact, for pi ≤ pi ≤ pi + ǫi
1
ǫi
(pi − pi)− 1 +
pi
2ǫ2i
(pi − pi)−
p2i
2ǫ2i
−
p2i
4ǫ2i
≤ 1− 1 + 0
p2i
2ǫ2i
−
p2i
4ǫ2i
≤ 0 (68)
For pi + ǫi ≤ pi ≤ pi + 2ǫi
1
ǫi
(pi − pi)− 1 +
pi
2ǫ2i
(pi − pi)−
p2i
2ǫ2i
−
p2i
4ǫ2i
≤ 2− 1−
pi
2ǫi
−
p2i
2ǫ2i
≤ 1−
pi + ǫi
2ǫi
−
(pi + ǫi)
2
2ǫ2i
=
= 1−
1
2
−
pi
2ǫi
−
p2i + 2piǫi + ǫ
2
i
2ǫ2i
= −
pi
2ǫi
−
p2i
2ǫ2i
−
pi
ǫi
≤ 0 (69)
Thus, ∂Ui(p)
∂pi
is decreasing in [pi, pi + 2ǫi]. Since
∂Ui(p)
∂pi
> 0 in [0, pi, ), a necessary and
sufficient condition such that pi is a global maximum is that
∂Ui(p)
∂pi
≤ 0 for pi → p+i . Imposing
such a condition we obtain pi ≥ 2ǫi, which concludes the proof.
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Fig. 1. Social welfare and total throughput vs. number of users, in the perfect monitoring scenario
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Fig. 2. Social welfare and total throughput vs. number of users, in the imperfect monitoring scenario, assuming nobody is aware
of the estimation errors
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Fig. 3. Social welfare and total throughput vs. number of users, in the imperfect monitoring scenario, assuming that only the
designer is aware of the estimation errors
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
−120
−100
−80
−60
−40
−20
0
Number of users
Su
m
 u
tili
ty
Imperfect monitoring, everybody aware, θi = 1 ; εi = 0.1
 
 
Cooperation
Pricing
Intervention
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
Number of users
Su
m
 th
ro
ug
hp
ut
Imperfect monitoring, everybody aware, θi = 1 ; εi = 0.1
 
 
Cooperation
Pricing
Intervention
Fig. 4. Social welfare and total throughput vs. number of users, in the imperfect monitoring scenario, assuming everybody is
aware of the estimation errors
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Fig. 5. Threshold vs. noise in the imperfect monitoring scenario, assuming everybody is aware of the estimation errors
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Fig. 6. Social welfare and total throughput vs. number of users adopting pricing, for different scenarios
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Fig. 7. Social welfare and total throughput vs. number of users adopting intervention, for different scenarios
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Fig. 8. The users’ actions and the average level of intervention vs. number of users in the imperfect monitoring scenario, assuming
everybody is aware of the estimation errors, adopting the considered policy and the optimal one
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Fig. 9. Social welfare and total throughput vs. number of users in the imperfect monitoring scenario, assuming everybody is
aware of the estimation errors, adopting the considered policy and the optimal one
